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THE RIGHT TO PENSION BENEFITS UNDER
ERISA WHEN A NONEMPLOYEE SPOUSE
PREDECEASES THE EMPLOYEE SPOUSE
Stacy Lynn Anderson
Abstract: Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, retirement benefits can-
not be assigned or alienated. In 1984, Congress enacted the Retirement Equity Act (REA)
which allowed retirement benefits to be divided between former spouses upon divorce,
under a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). It is unclear whether the restriction
on alienation of benefits extended to a transfer of the interests of a nonemployee spouse
who predeceases the employee spouse, and if so, whether such a disposition is within the
QDRO exception. In a two-to-one decision in Ablamis v. Roper, the Ninth Circuit held
that the exception did not extend to such testamentary bequests. Ablamis, however, is
contrary to the equitable principles of REA. This Comment critically examines the ineq-
uities which Ablamis' interpretation of the QDRO exception creates for nonemployee
spouses, and urges Congress to amend ERISA to allow state law to determine whether a
nonemployee spouse has an interest in the employee spouse's qualified pension plan that
can be disposed of as an asset of the nonemployee spouse's estate.
In 1974, in response to the failure of private pension plans to deliver
benefits to retirees,' Congress enacted the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) to regulate the private pension system.2
Under ERISA's spendthrift provision, pension benefits could not be
"assigned or alienated," 3 in order to protect a stream of income for
employees and their dependents.4 Due to the general wording of the
spendthrift provision, however, it was unclear whether the provision's
anti-alienation requirements preempted state laws that allowed the
division of future pension benefits subject to divorce or separation.5
1. See Private Welfare and Pension Plan Study, 1971: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971)
[hereinafter Private Welfare Hearings] (statement of Sen. Williams, chairman of the
subcommittee); see also infra note 27.
2. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). However, there are many
retirement plans that are not subject to ERISA's regulations. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051;
1081(a) (1988).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
4. Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990). The
spendthrift provision states: "Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the
plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
5. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1462 (9th Cir. 1991). Section 514(a) of ERISA preempts
all state laws that relate to employee benefit plans covered by Title I of ERISA. 88 Stat. 897
(1974).
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Shortly after ERISA's enactment, it became clear that the statute
did not adequately protect the interests of women.6 Many women
found that upon divorce, separation, or the death of their spouses, they
had no right to share in their husbands' retirement benefits.7 In the
years following the enactment of ERISA, courts generally responded
to this dilemma by determining that the spendthrift provision did not
apply in cases involving domestic relations. 8 Congress settled the issue
when it passed the Retirement Equity Act (REA4) in 1984.9 REA
amended ERISA to allow an employee's pension benefits to be divided
between the spouses upon the dissolution of their marriage under a
qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).10
Although REA relieved the harsh effects of the spendthrift provi-
sion in divorce or separation situations, it failed to address the conse-
quences that the clause would have in a case where the dissolution was
the result of the nonemployee spouse's death, rather than divorce."1
In Employees Savings Plan of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Geer, 12 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
ERISA did not preempt community property laws affecting the distri-
bution of pension interests upon the employee spouse's death.13 The
court did not consider, however, whether community property laws
would prevail if the nonemployee spouse were to die before the
employee spouse. 14 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered
the issue inAblamis v. Roper, 15 and held that the spendthrift provision
prevented a nonemployee spouse who predeceased the employee
spouse from disposing of any interest in the qualified pension plan. 16
The court also held that an attempt by the deceased nonemployee
6. Camilla E. Watson, Broken Promises Revisited: The Window of Vulnerability for Surviving
Spouses Under ERISA, 76 IowA L. REv. 431, 435 (1991).
7. See generally Retirement Equity Act of 1983: Hearing on S. 19 Before the Subcommittee on
Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 49-59
(1983) [hereinafter Retirement Equity Hearings].
8. Stephen R. Snodgrass, Note, ERISA Preemption of State Law: The Meaning of'Relate To'
in Section 514, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 143, 157 (1980).
9. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1.26 (1984).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (1988).
11. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1465 (9th Cir. 1991).
12. 535 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
13. Id. at 1055.
14. Id.
15. 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
16. Id. at 1460; see also Op. Dep't of Labor, 90-46 A, 90-47 A (1990) available in LEXIS,
Labor Library, ERISA File (two advisory opinions in which the Department of Labor concludes
that Congress did not contemplate the application of the QDRO exception to a court order
authorizing a nonemployee spouse's estate to claim one-half of an employee spouse's pension
benefits).
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spouse to dispose of the interest by will, through a probate court order,
was not within the QDRO exception.17
For retirement plans covered by ERISA, the 4blamis decision
causes severe inequities between nonemployee spouses whose mar-
riages end in divorce and those whose marriages end because of
death."8 These inequities are contrary to the congressional intent
behind the passage of REA.19 Therefore, Congress should amend
ERISA to eliminate the inequities created by ,4blamis.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
ERISA'S SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION AND THE
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES OF REA
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, employees were frequently left
without pension benefits due to mismanagement, corruption and
underfuinding of private pension plans.20 By enacting ERISA and
REA, Congress intended to assure greater financial security for pen-
sioners and their dependents.2" In providing this security, however,
there is one area that Congress has completely overlooked: that of a
nonemployee spouse who predeceases an employee spouse.
A. Congressional Action to Remedy the Plight of Retired Workers
Left with No Financial Security
1. The Need to Regulate the Private Pension System
Private pension plans existed in the United States as early as 1875,
when railroad companies began offering the plans as incentives for
older workers to retire.22 Over the next seventy years, there was a
gradual, but not significant, growth in the use of private retirement
plans.2 Immediately following World War II, however, private pen-
sions experienced a period of rapid growth due to an aging workforce,
concern about retirement security in the aftermath of the Great
Depression, and a change in focus by unions to deferred, rather then
current, compensation.2" By the early 1970s, private pension plans
covered an estimated 30 million workers, and controlled over $130
17. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1455.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 127-33.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 112-13.
20. See generally Private Welfare Hearings, supra note 1.
21. See Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990).
22. Watson, supra note 6, at 440.
23. Id. at 441.
24. Id. at 433, 442.
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billion in assets.2' These plans were largely unregulated, and in the
late 1960s it became apparent that effective legislation was needed to
police the system.26 When Congress held hearings on the need for
private pension reform, it learned that despite widespread coverage,
very few workers ever received any benefits.27
In an effort to provide greater security to workers, Congress passed
ERISA in 1974. ERISA established a comprehensive system of regu-
lations to control the management of private pension plans.28 The
main provisions of the Act established minimum fanding and vesting
requirements, plan termination insurance, fiduciary standards, and a
voluntary program of portability to preserve benefits upon change of
employment. 29 In addition to these provisions, ERISA contained a
spendthrift provision that was intended to protect workers and their
families by prohibiting the alienation or assignment of pension bene-
fits.30 Despite the extensive regulations, however, problems with
ERISA soon appeared."
2. REA Was Enacted to Alleviate the Disparities Between Male and
Female Workers, and to Provide Financial Security to
Nonemployee Spouses
In operation it became apparent that ERISA discriminated against
women." Congress drafted ERISA's provisions with male workers in
mind. 3 As a result, the statute did not recognize the contributions of
women to the economy and their unique work patterns.34 Statistics
indicated that ERISA was deficient in several resperts. First, working
women often were not covered by pension plans at all, or were eligible
25. Private Welfare Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Sen- Williams).
26. Watson, supra note 6, at 432-33.
27. Private Welfare Hearings, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Sen. Williams). Congressional
staff analyzed 87 private pension plans covering 9.8 million workers. The study found that 6.9
million workers participating in 51 of the plans had 11 years or more of service; of these, only 4
percent received benefits. Under the remaining 36 plans, 2.9 million workers had 10 years or less
of service; only 8 percent of them received benefits. Id
28. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.).
29. S. REP. No. 127, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838-39.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 32-40.
32. Watson, supra note 6, at 435.
33. Id.
34. Retirement Equity Hearings, supra note 7, at 14 (statement of Rep. Ferraro); see also id. at
3-4 (statement of Sen. Durenberger) ("The disparity that exists between men and women should
shock the conscience of a nation founded upon the principle of equal opportunity .... Society
has encouraged women to work, to raise and care for their families, but has refused to recognize
the invaluable efforts of the homemaker as 'work.' ").
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only for minimal benefit payments.35 Second, ERISA's age require-
ments excluded the majority of the female workforce.3 6 Third, ERISA
failed to recognize that women were more likely than men to work
part-time, and consequently, were less likely to meet ERISA's stan-
dards for one "year" of service.37 Fourth, ERISA did not address the
needs of working mothers. 38 Fifth, no pension plan existed for home-
makers.39 Finally, women were not protected in the case of divorce,
because it was unclear whether the spendthrift provision prevented
pension benefits from being divided between spouses at divorce.' In
1984, Congress addressed these issues by enacting the Retirement
Equity Act.41 REA provided for a lower participation age,42 auto-
matic survivor benefits,43 and the division of pension benefits upon
divorce. 44 Each of these mechanisms helped to eliminate ERISA's dis-
parate treatment of men and women.
3. The Answer to the Divorce Dilemma: The QDRO
Congress included in REA an express exception to the spendthrift
provision for divorce or separation decrees in confirmation of court
rulings that ERISA's spendthrift provision did not preempt the divi-
sion of pension rights upon the dissolution of marriage.45 Under the
QDRO exception, the spendthrift provision does not apply to the right
35. Id. at 43 (statement of Ms. Betty McElderry, Oklahoma State division president,
American Association of University Women). Overall, only 21% of female workers were
covered by pension plans compared to 49% of male workers. Id. at 11 (statement of Sen.
Hawkins). Of the 21% of women who were covered, only 13% actually received any benefits.
Id.
36. The highest proportion of working women was in the 20- to 24-year-old age range. Id. at
24 (statement of Ms. Janie Sowards, President, Oklahoma Federation of Business and
Professional Women's Clubs). Yet coverage under ERISA was not required under the age of 25.
Id.
37. Id.
38. Women were especially vulnerable to the lack of coverage by pensions since they were
likely to stop their careers to have children. Id. (statement of Ms. Janie Sowards). Such a break
in service often limited the pension credit earned or even caused a loss of all previously earned
credits. Id.
39. Id. at 14 (statement of Rep. Ferraro).
40. Id. at 44 (statement of Ms. Betty MeElderry); see also supra text accompanying notes
3-5.
41. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988) (setting the participation age at 21).
43. Id § 1055(b)(1)(C)(i) (requiring the consent of the surviving spouse in order to waive the
automatic survivor's benefits).
44. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(A) (allowing pension benefits payable pursuant to a QDRO to be
assigned and alienated).
45. Id. § 1056(d)(3).
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to receive pension benefits pursuant to a "qualified domestic relations
order."46
To constitute a QDRO, a domestic relations order must be in the
form of a judgment, decree or order made pursuant to a state domestic
relations law.47 The order must create or recognize the right of an
alternate payee to a portion of the pension benefits, and relate to the
provision of child support, alimony or marital property rights to a
spouse, former spouse, child or other dependent.48
Even though the QDRO exception clarified the law in the case of
divorce or separation, the law's scope was unclear. In requiring that a
QDRO be made pursuant to state domestic relations law, Congress
added the words "including a community property law."49 This refer-
ence to community property did not indicate whether the QDRO
exception extended to state community property law governing the
disposition of community assets at death.
B. A Minority of Community Property States Terminates
Nonemployee Spouses' Pension Interests upon Their Deaths
If ERISA's restriction on alienation applies to the testamentary dis-
position of nonemployee spouses, the provision will have the same
effect as the "terminable interest rule," which ends all property rights
of a nonemployee spouse who predeceases the employee spouse.
Under the terminable interest rule, the retirement plan interests trace-
able to contributions of community funds or to community labor con-
stitute community property, but the interest of the nonparticipant
spouse terminates upon the death of either spouse.50 An employee
spouse who is the first to die is able to dispose of all the post-death
benefits, not just his or her half interest in the community property. 1
When nonemployee spouses die first, however, their testamentary
power to leave their community property interest to a third party does
not extend to the pension benefits.52 Under this doctrine, dissolution
46. Id § 1056(d)(3)(A).
47. Id § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii).
48. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B).
49. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II).
50. William A. Reppy, Jr., Community and Separate Interests in Pinsions and Social Security
Benefits After Marriage of Brown and ERISA, 25 UCLA L. REv. 417, 443-44 (1978).
51. Id. In pension plans regulated by ERISA, however, the nonemployee spouse's interest is
not divested upon the death of the employee spouse. Rather, the nonparticipant spouse is
entitled to an automatic survivor's annuity. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1988).
52. Reppy, supra note 50, at 444.
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of the community by divorce, rather than by death, does not terminate
the nonemployee spouse's interest.-3
Community property states do not agree with traditional property
states regarding the application of the terminable interest rule upon
the death of a nonemployee spouse.5 4 A minority of the community
property states that have considered the issue55 applies the terminable
interest rule to divest nonemployee spouses of their interests in pen-
sions earned by community labor.5 6 However, a majority of states has
declined to apply the terminable interest rule in the case of a private
pension where the nonemployee spouse predeceases the employee
spouse."s By terminating the pension interests of a nonemployee
spouse who dies first, these states believe that the terminable interest
rule denies nonemployee spouses the right to use and enjoy their full
share of community property.5
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Application of the Spendthrift
Provision in the Testamentary Context
At least two courts have attempted to define the scope of the spend-
thrift provision in the context of testamentary dispositions of pension
interests.5 9 In Employees Savings Plan of Mobil Oil Corp. v. Geer, I a
United States district court held that ERISA does not preempt state
laws governing the disposition of pension interests upon the death of a
predeceasing employee spouse.61 In Ablamis v. Roper,62 however, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that ERISA does preempt
state law that would otherwise allow a predeceasing nonemployee
53. Id
54. See infra notes 55-57.
55. Idaho and Nevada have no law on the terminable interest rule. William Reppy, Jr.,
Update on the Terminable Interest Doctrine: Abolished in California; Adopted and Expanded in
Arizona, COMMUNITY PROP. J., July 1987, at 10.
56. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 890.1 (West Supp. 1991); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.31(3),
766.62(5) (West 1981). The Arizona Supreme Court has applied a form of the rule to life
insurance proceeds under a contract between a spouse and the insurer. Reppy, supra note 55, at
9.
57. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800.8 (West Supp. 1992); Schweitzer v. Burch, 711 P.2d 889
(N.M. 1985); Allard v. Frech, 754 S.W.2d 111 (fex. 1988), cerL denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989);
Farver v. Dep't of Retirement Systems, 97 Wash. 2d 344, 644 P.2d 1149 (1982). Texas does,
however, apply the rule to statutorily-created pension plans. See Lack v. Lack, 584 S.W.2d 896
(fex. Civ. App. 1979).
58. Reppy, supra note 55, at 9.
59. See Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991); Employees Say. Plan of Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Geer, 535 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
60. 535 F. Supp. 1052 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
61. Id. at 1055.
62. 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
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spouse to make a testamentary transfer of her interest in an employee
spouse's pension.63 The conflict inherent in these two decisions illus-
trates the problems brought on by the general language of the spend-
thrift provision.
1. Employees Savings Plan of Mobil Oil Corporation v. Geer
In Geer, an employee spouse had designated beneficiaries to receive
his pension benefits after his death." When the employee died, his
wife claimed that she was entitled to half of the pension benefits as her
share of a community property asset.65 The district court held that
ERISA did not preempt community property laws to the extent that
they affect the distribution of pension interests after the death of the
employee spouse.66 The court based this decision on two factors.
First, the Texas community property laws governing the distribution
of pension benefits were not preempted by section 514 of ERISA.67
Second, the state law did not do "major damage" to a "clear and sub-
stantial" federal interest.6
8
Section 514 of ERISA preempts any state laws that "relate to" an
employee benefit plan.69 The Geer court determined that a community
property law requiring distribution of community assets upon death
did not "relate to" ERISA pension plans because the state law did not
attempt to regulate pension plans.70 Although the state law had an
impact on the pension plan, the court concluded that the impact was
too remote to constitute a "relation to" ERISA.7
In determining that Texas community property rights did not
"relate to" ERISA, the Geer court also considered the Supreme
Court's ruling in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,72 that the subject of domes-
tic relations was the province of the states, and should not be invaded
63. Id. at 1460.
64. Geer, 535 F. Supp. at 1053.
65. Id. The spouses entered into a common law marriage whle domiciled in Texas, a
community property state. Id. The community property system provides for shared ownership
by husband and wife of all property that is earned by the labor of either spouse during the
marriage (unless they agree to the contrary). WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR, & CYNTHIA A. SAMUEL,
COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1-1, 3-1 (3d ed. 199 1). Thus, each spouse has
a one-half ownership interest in any future benefits earned by the employee spouse's labor during
marriage.
66. Geer, 535 F. Supp. at 1055.
67. Id at 1054.
68. Id at 1055.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
70. Geer, 535 F. Supp. at 1054.
71. Id
72. 439 U.S. 572 (1979), superseded by 45 U.S.C. § 231m(b)(2).
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unless Congress "'positively required by direct enactment' that state
law be pre-empted." '73 In Hisquierdo, the Supreme Court held that in
order for state family law to be preempted, there must be more than
just a mere conflict of words between the federal statute and the state
law.74 The state law must do "major damage" to "clear and substan-
tial" federal interests before preemption will be found.7 5
The Geer court determined that the state law did not meet the His-
quierdo standard for preemption. First, the court held that the state
community property law would not do "major damage" to federal
interests.76 The court found that the federal interest behind ERISA
was to provide protection for employees against their employers, not
to preserve benefits for any particular beneficiary.77 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that distributions of assets under the state commu-
nity property law did not damage that federal interest.7" Second, the
court determined that even if there were a major federal interest at
stake, it would not result in substantial damage to that interest because
the application of community property law in the instant case would
be so limited.79
Although Geer is helpful in determining congressional intent
regarding ERISA preemption in the testamentary context, the scope
of the decision is limited because it was decided before the enactment
of REA and the QDRO exception. Additionally, Geer only addressed
preemption upon the death of the employee spouse, not the nonem-
ployee spouse. The testamentary power of a nonemployee spouse was
directly addressed, however, in Ablamis v. Roper,80 the only post-REA
case which addresses the issue of ERISA's preemption when the non-
employee spouse dies first.
2. Ablamis v. Roper
In Ablamis, a nonemployee spouse died, leaving all of her property
to two trusts for the benefit of her spouse and children, and her chil-
dren from a former marriage." When the executrix of her estate
claimed a community property interest in the employee spouse's
73. Id. at 581 (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Geer, 535 F. Supp. at 1055.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1056.
79. Id.
80. 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
81. Id. at 1452. This bequest included her one-half interest in all community property. Id
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vested rights under two profit sharing plans, the trustee of the plans
brought a declaratory relief action to stop the executrix. 2
The majority in the two-to-one decision held that ERISA's spend-
thrift provision preempted California community property law.83
Therefore, ERISA prohibits a transfer by a predeceasing nonemployee
spouse of her interest in an employee spouse's pension benefits.8" The
Ablamis court found that the spendthrift provision prohibited retire-
ment benefits from being assigned or alienated, and concluded that
any exception to this provision must be expressly mandated by Con-
gress.8 5 The court determined that the QDRO was such an excep-
tion.8 6 In order for Ms. Ablamis' testamentary lequest to be given
effect, therefore, it had to fall within the QDRO exception. However,
the court determined that the probate court order tipholding the testa-
mentary bequest was not a QDRO for two reasons. First, the order
did not meet the statutory requirements of the QDRO exception, and
second, the legislative history behind REA showed that Congress did
not intend for the QDRO exception to include a probate order.8 7
a. The Probate Order Did Not Meet the Statutory Requirements for
a QDRO
The probate order did not qualify as a QDRO for several reasons.
First, to constitute a QDRO, a domestic relations order must be made
pursuant to a state domestic relations law.8 8 The Ablamis court
declared that the term "domestic relations law" could not be con-
strued so as to include a probate order 8 9 Under the court's definition,
"[d]omestic relations orders deal with household or family matters,"
and are completely distinct from probate law, which establishes wills
and settles decedents' estates.' ° The court cited Congress' failure to
include the term "probate order" as further evidence of its intention to
exclude probate orders from the QDRO exception. 91
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1460. For the purposes of the opinion, the court assumed that California law
authorized a predeceasing nonemployee spouse to make a testamentary- transfer of her interest in
the employee spouse's pension benefits. In a footnote, however, the court concluded that no
California case allows such a bequest, and the California Supreme Court has not yet addressed
the issue. Id. at 1455 n.8.
84. Id. at 1460.
85. Id. at 1454.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1455.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(II) (1988).
89. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1456.
90. Id
91. Id
634
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Second, a QDRO recognizes the right of an alternate payee to
receive a portion of the pension benefits.92 The term alternate payee is
limited, however, to a spouse, former spouse, child or other dependent
of the participant.93 The court held that Ms. Ablamis' estate did not
constitute an alternate payee because the estate was not a spouse, for-
mer spouse, child or other dependent of Mr. Ablamis.94
Third, a QDRO must relate to the provision of child support, ali-
mony or marital property rights to a spouse, former spouse, child or
other dependent.95 The court concluded that the probate order did
not relate to the support of a spouse, former spouse, child or other
dependent because as a deceased person, Ms. Ablamis was not a
spouse or other dependent of the participant.96 In addition, the court
found that Ms. Ablamis did not qualify as a former spouse because
that term refers solely to divorced spouses, not deceased spouses.97
For the above reasons, the court held that the order was not a
QDRO.98
b. The Legislative History of REA Shows That the QDRO
Exception Does Not Include a Testamentary Disposition
by a Nonemployee Spouse
In addition to the statutory language of the QDRO exception, the
legislative history of REA indicated that Congress did not intend for
the QDRO exception to include probate orders.99 The Ablamis court
focused on two factors. First, the court found that one of the primary
purposes of the QDRO exception was to provide security for an
employee's immediate family members in the case of divorce or sepa-
ration."°° The court reasoned that Ms. Ablamis' bequest would not
protect Mr. Ablamis, his immediate family or a former spouse. 101
Instead, the court determined that the probate order would deprive
Mr. Ablamis and his immediate family of pension benefits, and there-
fore, the bequest was contrary to the legislative purpose of REA.102
Second, the court found the bequest objectionable because it would
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(I) (1988).
93. Id. § 1056(d)(3)(K).
94. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1456.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (1988).
96. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1456.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1455-56.
99. Id. at 1455.
100. Id. at 1456-57.
101. Id. at 1457.
102. Id.
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take benefits away from the living members of the decedent's fam-
ily."I The court declared that because pensions are designed to bene-
fit the living, Congress' fundamental purpose in enacting ERISA was
to provide security for both spouses during their lifetimes. " Accord-
ing to the majority, this purpose would be contravened if a deceased
spouse was allowed to take benefits away from a surviving spouse and
give them to a third person through the use of a testamentary
bequest."0 The Ablamis court concluded, therefo:re, that the legisla-
tive history of REA shows that Congress did not intend for a probate
order to come within the QDRO exception." °
c. Judge Fletcher's Dissent
In a strong dissent, Judge Fletcher attacked the majority's QDRO
analysis as premature. 7 In her opinion, the issue of whether the pro-
bate court order constitutes a QDRO did not need to be reached
unless there was a fundamental conflict between California commu-
nity property law and ERISA's spendthrift provision.108 Like the
Geer court, Judge Fletcher argued that when state family-property law
is at issue, the Supreme Court requires ERISA's preemptive effect to
be construed narrowly. 9 Judge Fletcher contended that the trustee
of the retirement plans had the burden of showing that the California
law which authorized a testamentary bequest cf pension benefits
"would do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal inter-
ests.""1  Judge Fletcher argued that the trustee should not prevail
because he failed to make such a showing. 1
103. L
104. Ia
105. Id
106. Id at 1455.
107. Id at 1462 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). Judge Fletcher also a-gued that California law
does, in fact, authorize a predeceased nonemployee spouse to make a testamentary bequest of a
portion of an employee spouse's pension benefits. According to Judge Fletcher, the lower court
relied on the terminable interest rule when it declared that such a bequest was not allowed under
California law. Judge Fletcher concluded that the terminable interest rule was abolished both by
the state legislature, with the addition of Civil Code Section 4800.8, and by judicial
pronouncement. Ia at 1460-62.
108. Ad at 1462.
109. AL; see also supra text accompanying notes 72-75.
110. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1462.
111. Id.
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II. AMENDING ERISA TO PROMOTE FAIR TREATMENT
OF NONEMPLOYEE SPOUSES
In light of the congressional purpose behind REA' 12 and the poten-
tial for grave inequities that exists with the outcome of Ablamis, the
QDRO exception is unfair in its selective assistance for nonemployee
spouses. To make the law fairer in its treatment of nonemployee
spouses, Congress should amend ERISA so that it defers to state law
to decide whether nonemployee spouses can make testamentary
bequests of their interest in employee spouses' pensions.
A. The Legislative History of REA Supports Equity for All
Nonemployee Spouses
Congress enacted REA in an effort to eliminate disparities between
male and female workers and to protect nonemployee spouses.' 1 3 In
recognizing that marriage is an economic partnership,' 14 Congress
acknowledged that pensions are earned by both spouses in a marriage.
Congress realized that nonemployee spouses make a substantial con-
tribution to the marriage regardless of whether they work inside or
outside the home. 5 This contribution is no greater in the case of a
divorced spouse than it is in the case of a married spouse. The
Ablamis decision, however, is contrary to congressional intent in rec-
ognizing the contributions made by divorced nonemployee spouses,
but refusing to acknowledge those made by married nonemployee
spouses. Although Congress never explicitly discussed the issue, the
existing legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress did
intend to protect pension interests in the married nonemployee
spouse's situation.
B. Ablamis Is Inequitable to Nonemployee Spouses
The Ablamis ruling is contrary to congressional intent because the
decision is unfair to nonemployee spouses. First, Ablamis treats
employee spouses and nonemployee spouses differently. According to
Ablamis, it is unfair for a deceased nonemployee spouse to deprive a
living employee spouse of support which is necessary for the
employee's continued existence. 1 16 On the other hand, it is acceptable
for a deceased employee spouse to take such support away from a liv-
112. See supra text accompanying notes 32-44.
113. Id.
114. S. REP. No. 575, 98th Cong., 2d Seas. 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547.
115. Id.
116. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir. 1991).
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ing nonemployee spouse. Second, Ablamis unjustly confiscates a non-
employee spouse's pension interest, completely ignoring marital
property rights under community property law. Finally, Ablamis
treats nonemployee spouses with different marital, statuses inconsis-
tently. Ablamis distorts congressional intent by recognizing the con-
tributions that divorced nonemployee spouses make to the marital
partnership, while disregarding the similar assistance that is given by
married nonemployee spouses.' 1 7 In light of the equitable purposes
behind REA, it is unlikely that Congress intended these inequalities.
L Ablamis Treats Employee Spouses and Nonemployee Spouses
Differently
Ablamis creates unequal treatment between nonemployee spouses
and employee spouses. Nonemployee spouses are deprived of their
testamentary power to dispose of community property while employee
spouses are freely allowed to devise their pension interests. There is
no logical basis for this unequal treatment.
A main governmental concern in pension regulation is to provide
for the subsistence of the employee and the spouse.11 8 The govern-
ment's interest is not limited to the employee, however, simply because
the nonemployee spouse's need for subsistence ends at death.1 19 If the
government had only a limited interest, then it would likewise prohibit
testamentary disposition of pension benefits by an employee spouse
since its interest in the employee spouse's subsistence would also end
upon death. However, ERISA allows predeceasing employee spouses
to bequeath their one-half share of the pension benefits. 120 Therefore,
Ablamis' unequal treatment of nonemployee spouses and employee
spouses is counter to the goals of ERISA.
One court has argued that the unequal treatment of employee
spouses and nonemployee spouses is explained by the fact that Con-
gress did not intend to benefit the heirs or legatees of nonemployee
spouses. 12' However, employee salaries were not designed to confer
such a benefit either, yet predeceasing nonemployee spouses have the
right to bequeath their one-half interest in any property that repre-
117. The disparity that Ablamis creates between divorced and married women is so great that
some commentators have even suggested it will encourage terminally ill people to get divorces.
Victoria Slind-Flor, 9th Circuit Limits Pension Bequest: Will Ruling Encourage Divorces?, NAT'L
L.J., July 22, 1991, at 9.
118. Waite v. Waite, 492 P.2d 13, 21 (Cal. 1972), superseded by CAL. CIv. CODE § 4800.8.
119. Id.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b)(1)(C)(i) (1988).
121. Waite, 492 P.2d at 21 n.8.
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sents the savings from the salary of an employee spouse.1 22 Salaries
and pensions are both forms of compensation earned by community
labor. Any difference between nonemployee spouses' interest in earn-
ings and the right to pension benefits is a matter of form, not of sub-
stance. Therefore, Ablamis' unequal treatment is wrong.
2. Ablamis Unjustly Enriches the Employee Spouse
Another unfair aspect of the Ablamis decision is that it unjustly
enriches employee spouses. ERISA's spendthrift provision presup-
poses that employee spouses, or their designated beneficiaries, are the
sole owners of the pension proceeds. 123 Nonemployee spouses, how-
ever, can justly claim one-half ownership of the proceeds because they
"are the fruits of funds [which were] originally [the nonemployee
spouses']."' 24 In a community property system, nonemployee spouses
are entitled to a one-half ownership interest of future benefits earned
by employee spouses during marriage.121 Under Ablamis, however,
ownership of the one-half interest dissolves upon the nonemployee
spouse's death. Therefore, because nonemployee spouses are not
allowed to make testamentary bequests of their half ownership interest
in pension benefits, employee spouses are unjustly enriched. The deci-
sion effectively confiscates the half interest of nonemployee spouses
and diverts it to employee spouses, giving the employees complete con-
trol over a substantial community asset.' 26 Thus, the protections
afforded nonemployee spouses by the community property system are
destroyed by Ablamis. The Ablamis decision leaves nonemployee
spouses without remedies, unable to even get reimbursement for the
community contributions made to the plan. Had the nonemployee
spouses known that they would be deprived of their ownership rights,
they may not have consented to any employee contribution of commu-
nity funds to the pension. Nonemployee spouses should at least be
able to recover their share of any community contributions made to
the pension plan. Therefore, Ablamis was wrong to confiscate nonem-
ployee spouses' property.
122. Reppy, supra note 50, at 471.
123. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 662 (1950) (Minton, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. See supra note 65.
126. Increasingly, pension benefits are often the largest part of an estate. Slind-Flor, supra
note 117, at 9.
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3. Ablamis Treats Nonemployee Spouses Differently Depending on
Their Marital Status
Ablamis results in the disparate treatment of nonemployee spouses
who are divorced and those who are still married, because it recog-
nizes a divorced nonemployee spouse's contribution to a marriage
partnership, but not the contribution of a married nonemployee
spouse. This case can be illustrated with a simple example: Amy is
married and community property funds are used to contribute to her
husband's retirement plan. Amy dies, and her will attempts to make a
bequest of her interest in her husband's pension pl-n. Under ERISA,
as interpreted by Ablamis, state law is preempted, and the bequest is
invalid. This is true even though Amy had an ownership interest in
one-half of the funds contributed to the plan. Because the law is pre-
empted, Amy's estate cannot even recover the amount of Amy's con-
tribution to the fund.
Beth is also married, but her husband uses his own separate prop-
erty to make contributions to his pension plan. Beth and her husband
get divorced, and the divorce decree, a QDRO, divides the interest in
the husband's retirement plan. Beth dies leaving a will that devises
her interest in the pension plan. In this situation, ERISA does not
preempt state law, and the bequest is upheld, despite the fact that the
pension was her husband's separate property prior to the divorce. 127
The only difference between Amy and Beth was that Beth got
divorced. Simply because she got a divorce, Beth was granted the
same share of the pension benefits that she would have been entitled to
if "she had remained married and her husband predeceased her."12
Beth enjoyed "full right, title and interest" in her pension benefits, and
she was "free to bequeath any funds remaining at the time of her death
to the beneficiary of her choice." 129
This example illustrates the inequity that the Ablamis decision cre-
ates among nonemployee spouses. In the example, the divorced non-
employee spouse is treated more favorably than the married
nonemployee spouse. However, divorced nonemployee spouses are no
more deserving of rights to pension benefits than married nonem-
ployee spouses. The divorcees do not make any greater contribution
127. Even though the pension was her husband's separate property, Beth would have had an
interest in the pension if he had predeceased her while they were still married, because ERISA
provides for an automatic surviving spouse's annuity that can only be opted out of with the
consent of both spouses. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2) (1988).
128. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1457 (1991).
129. Id.
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to the marriage. Therefore, the system established by Ablamis is
unfair and contrary to congressional intent.
Some courts contend that the disparity between divorced nonem-
ployee spouses and married nonemployee spouses is justified because
the two classes of nonemployee spouses are distinguishable on the the-
ory that community property claims are less worthy because they are
not based on need."' 0 This view is not persuasive, however, because
under the QDRO exception, divorced nonemployee spouses are not
required to have a claim based on need."' The division of benefits
may simply relate to the former spouses' marital property rights, 3 2
which is the same basis for the claim of predeceasing nonemployee
spouses. If the award of pension benefits in a divorce decree is due to a
property settlement, and not child support or alimony, those funds are
not in payment for the support of the family. The divorced spouses
can do whatever they want with those funds, including bequeath them
to anyone they choose, not simply the children. 33 Therefore, pension
benefits divided in divorce decrees might not be used to support the
needs of the family. While pre-QDRO courts may have been basing
divorce awards of pension benefits on the support need of ex-spouses,
that basis is no longer required. Thus, it is unjust to distinguish
between divorced nonemployee spouses and married nonemployee
spouses whose claims may both be based on marital property rights.
C. Given that Ablamis Is Contrary to the Legislative Intent Behind
REA, Congress Must Act to End the Inequalities Created
by the Decision
1. Congress Should Resolve the Problem by Amending ERISA
Given that Ablamis is contrary to the equitable purposes of REA,
Congress should amend ERISA, thereby eliminating Ablamis' unjust
results. An amendment to ERISA would allow Congress to assess the
full extent of the inequities created by Ablamis and address the prob-
lem in a way that best recognizes the rights of all spouses. A congres-
sional amendment would avoid the piecemeal approach that will occur
130. See Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 587 (1979) ("It is... logical to conclude
that Congress... thought that a family's need for support could justify garnishment, . . . but that
community property claims, which are not based on need, could not do so."), superseded by 45
U.S.C. § 231m(b)(2); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (I[A]
garnishment order used to satisfy court ordered family support payments is impliedly excepted
from preempted state law .... ").
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B) (1988) (the order must relate to the provision of child support,
alimony, or marital property rights) (emphasis added).
132. Id.
133. Ablamis, 937 F.2d at 1457.
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if another circuit court addresses the issue of a nonemployee spouse's
testamentary power and rejects the Ablamis holding.
Congress has two alternatives that would eliminate the inequities
that Ablamis creates for nonemployee spouses. Congress could either
defer to state law on whether nonemployee spouses should have testa-
mentary power over pension interests or enact an amendment which
expressly grants such power.
a. Congress Could Defer to State Law Regarding the Status of a
Testamentary Disposition by a Predeceasing Nonemployee
Spouse
Congress could resolve the problems created by Ablamis by amend-
ing ERISA to allow states to decide whether the pension interest of a
predeceasing nonemployee spouse terminates upon the death of that
spouse. This alternative offers the advantage of a entire system of law
on this issue that is already in place. The community property states
have all previously addressed the terminable interest doctrine and
decided whether it applies upon the death of the nonemployee
spouse."' Additionally, there are precedents for congressional defer-
ence to state law governing property rights in domestic relations cases.
The QDRO exception specifically defers to state law to determine the
division of property upon divorce or separation. 135
Deferring to state law does present some disadvantages, however.
Courts will have to go through the complex procedure of tracing the
source of pension funds to determine the status of a nonemployee
spouse's pension interest. The pension benefits may or may not be
community assets, depending on the type of retirement plan, and
whether the employee's contributions came from community, or sepa-
rate funds. 136 In addition, tracing funds becomes more complicated
when families migrate between common law states and community
property states. 1 37 These disadvantages are not insurmountable, how-
ever. Although the process is complex, tracing pension contributions
is not a major obstacle. Courts already must trace pension funds upon
divorce. Further, many pension plans are exempt from ERISA provi-
134. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (1988) (a QDRO is any judgment, decree or order made
pursuant to a state domestic relations law).
136. See REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 65, at 6-11 n.1. The type of plan determines what
method of apportionment will be used to assess the community property portion of the benefits.
Id. With some types of pension plans, the community share will depend on the amount of
community funds contributed. Id.
137. See generally Hrant Norsigian, Note, Community Property and the Problem of
Migration, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 773 (1988).
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sions, including its anti-alienation clause.13 Under these plans, state
law is not preempted. Therefore, in states where the terminable inter-
est rule has been abolished, courts must trace the contributions to
these pension plans.
If Congress does decide to defer to state law, the ERISA amend-
ment must define the scope of nonemployee spouses' testamentary
power. One reason the Ablamis result was so unjust is that Ms.
Ablamis was bequeathing her pension interest to her children from a
previous marriage and to her spouse.13 9 She was trying to help her
family. Congress' purpose in enacting ERISA was to provide for
employee spouses and their families, 1" not some third party. There-
fore, the scope of nonemployee spouses' testamentary power should be
limited. For the same reasons, employee spouses' testamentary power
should also be limited. Congress should limit the scope of both
spouses' testamentary power by providing that they may only desig-
nate a relative as beneficiary. This limitation comports with the goals
of ERISA and avoids the inequalities of Ablamis.
b. Congress Could Specifically Grant Nonemployee Spouses the
Right to Make Testamentary Dispositions of Their
Interests in Employee Spouses' Pension Benefits
Another alternative to the problems created by Ablamis is for Con-
gress to amend ERISA to specifically define the interest that a nonem-
ployee spouse has in the retirement plan and to allow the nonemployee
spouse to designate a beneficiary to receive that defined interest when
the nonemployee spouse dies.
With this proposed amendment, Congress will have to consider
whether nonemployee spouses are entitled to a pension interest that is
less than or equal to that of employee spouses. If Congress decides
that the share should be less than that of employee spouses, then it will
have to determine what percentage of the pension should be allocated
to nonemployee spouses. Congress will also need to decide whether
nonemployee spouses should have their share limited to the recovery
of their portion of those funds contributed, or if the share should
include a portion of the pension fund's growth. Further, Congress
should address whether nonemployee spouses should have unlimited
testamentary power, as with a divorced nonemployee spouse, or lim-
ited power to make a testamentary bequest only when the beneficiary
138. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051; 1081(a) (1988).
139. Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1991).
140. Id. at 1456-57.
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is a relative. These are just a few of the issues that Congress must
address in amending ERISA.
Congress also must consider the effect that these proposed amend-
ments will have on non-community property states. Amendment of
ERISA or the QDRO exception will override state law and give non-
employee spouses pension interests which the states have previously
refused to recognize. In most common law states, predeceasing non-
employee spouses have no testamentary power over assets earned by
employee spouses during marriage141 because noaemployee spouses
have no ownership interest in employee spouses' pensions. Therefore,
many of the arguments which support the recognition of testamentary
power in nonemployee spouses from community property states are
not applicable to nonemployee spouses from common law states.142
Congress may need to exclude common law states from an ERISA
amendment which grants nonemployee spouses testamentary disposi-
tion rights because there is not as much basis for preempting common
law property rights. Such an exception will add to the complexity of
any amendment. It will be especially difficult for Congress to draft an
amendment considering that the community property states do not
agree on the division of pension interests between employee spouses
and nonemployee spouses.143
D. Congressional Deference to State Law Is the Best Solution for
Solving the Predeceasing Nonemployee Spouse Issue
The best solution to the problems caused by Ablamis is to allow
state law to decide the issue of a testamentary disposition by a nonem-
ployee spouse. The success of the QDRO exception proves that defer-
ence to state law can effectively address the needs of nonemployee
spouses. 44 Deference to state law raises the issues of pension fund
tracing and the scope of a nonemployee spouse's testamentary power,
but these problems are manageable.1 45 By deferring to state law, Con-
gress will avoid the need for an extremely complex amendment which
would override separate property laws in common law states.1 46 Def-
erence to state law is the most equitable alternative because it fully
recognizes the ownership rights of spouses under state law. Employee
spouses in common law states and community property states which
141. REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 65, at 1-9 n.4.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 123-26.
143. See generally REPPY & SAMUEL, supra note 65, at 6-6 to 6-13.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 136-40.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 141-43.
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recognize the terminable interest rule will not be divested of their
property, and nonemployee spouses in community property states
which have abolished the terminable interest rule will not be divested
of their half interest in the pension funds. Therefore, deference to
state law best addresses the inequities of Ablamis.
III. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted ERISA and REA to protect employee pension
benefits and create equity for nonemployee spouses and female work-
ers. The Ablamis rule, however, produces an inequitable result. In
effect, the decision deprives nonemployee spouses of their ownership
rights in pension plans and differentiates between spousal interests on
the basis of marital status. A better approach to balancing the finan-
cial safeguards of the spendthrift provision and the equitable premise
behind REA is to defer to state law on the issue of a nonemployee
spouse's testamentary power. This approach provides for equality in
the treatment of all nonemployee spouses, and it gives full recognition
to the interests of all parties having ownership rights to the pension
proceeds. Congressional deference-to state law also avoids the neces-
sity of an extremely complex statute that would have to mesh commu-
nity property ownership rights with those of common law states.
Congress has the opportunity to end the inequality and finally give
nonemployee spouses the full recognition that they deserve by amend-
ing ERISA to correct the inequalities of Ablamis.
